Introduction
In order to evaluate the merits of particularism and generalism, we need to isolate precisely what is the main point of contention between the two views. This is not an easy matter and there have been many attempts at capturing this difference.
i I shall argue that the difference lies in what is taken as the locus of ethical correctness. The particularist takes this to lie in judgements about particular cases and the generalist denies this and claims that the priority is located in general principles. I
shall dispute both these claims by arguing that ethical correctness is located in ethical theories and that these should not be equated with a list of general principles.
I need to clarify two points about this claim before proceeding. In talking about ethical correctness, I am not claiming that there is always a uniquely correct answer to every moral problem. Indeed, my discussion of judgemental generalism in section four of this paper indicates some of the areas where there could be moral disagreement. Second, I am not suggesting that the task of moral judgements is solely to identify correct answers in an impassive, theoretical way. Judging morally is intimately connected with how we live our lives and the sort of people that we are. It is because of this that it is so important to identify where ethical correctness lies.
Roger Crisp has noted that "generalism is now the standard term for the contrary to particularism."
ii Whilst I accept this, in order to locate the precise nature of the difference between the two doctrines I argue that it is necessary to distinguish two types of generalism: subsumptive and judgemental generalism. This latter form of generalism allows us to locate much more precisely the essential point of difference between particularism and generalism since it allows such a large scope for attention to the particular case without it being a particularist doctrine. Jonathan Dancy, for example, considers that it is a particular danger of generalism that it allows insufficient attention to the particular case. He writes,
It is this sort of looking away that particularists see as the danger of generalism. Reasons function in new ways on new occasions, and if we don't recognise this fact and adapt our practice to it, we will make bad decisions. Generalism encourages a tendency not to look enough at the details of the case before one.
iii As I will show, judgemental generalism requires a detailed examination of the particular case. This discussion of judgemental generalism which, I argue, is to be preferred to subsumptive generalism, naturally leads to the reason for going beyond this and locating ethical correctness in ethical theories. These theories provide the guiding rationale for what is regarded as ethically correct.
I will show then that generalists, per se, are not debarred from paying attention to the specific case.
Principles can be applied to specific cases and this does not involve a "looking away" from the particular case. The kind of sensitivity that particularists claim is necessary for judging the morality of specific cases is not something that is denied to generalists. Dancy, for example, writes of the person on whom we can rely "to make sound moral judgements," that she will have "a broad range of sensitivities" and "to have the relevant sensitivities just is to be able to get things right case by case." iv John McDowell makes a similar point, "Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way." v Sensitivity to particular cases, seeing situations in a distinctive way, is something that generalism can allow. This is not to say that all generalist theses allow this but just that this sort of attention to particular cases is not incompatible with generalism per se, understood as involving, in some sense, the application of universal principles.
I shall take Kant's view as an example of judgemental generalism and use this to illustrate what I mean by claiming that ethical correctness is located in ethical theories rather than in the perception of particular situations. My aim is not to provide a defence of Kant's view per se, but rather to argue for the advantage of looking to ethical theories for the locus of ethical correctness, rather than judgements about particular situations.
Particularism
I shall concentrate on particularism as a thesis about reasons, at least initially, in order to locate the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism. There are two reasons for this. In the specific case of morality, Dancy makes it clear that moral principles specify the features that are the reasons to which generalists appeal. He writes,
Moral principles, however we conceive of them, seem all to be in the business of specifying features as general reasons. The principle that it is wrong to lie, for instance, presumably claims that mendacity is always a wrong making feature whenever it occurs ( pro tanto , of course, not necessarily absolutely).
x If moral reasons function holistically in the way indicated in the general specification above, then:
"it cannot be the case that the possibility of such reasons rests on the existence of principles that specify morally relevant features as functioning atomistically. A principle-based approach to ethics is inconsistent with the holism of reasons." xi If we take the example of the reason that it is wrong to lie, Dancy's point expressed in (1) above is that it might not always have the polarity of being a wrong making characteristic since it could, in some contexts, turn out to be a right making characteristic or even to have no significance at all, in the sense of not being regarded as a reason at all in some contexts. (ii) The particular is prior in the sense that the evaluation of the particular has authority over any general reason with which it might conflict. The locus of ethical correctness lies in the particular.
A second implication implicit in Dancy's characterization is that we clearly need to exercise judgement about the case before us. I will be showing that this feature is not distinctive of particularism, since it is also essential for the form of generalism that I call judgemental generalism.
A third implication is that this account of particularism implies the falsity of the universalizability thesis. This is because the thesis of universalizability incorporates the claim that if we judge one action to be right then we must judge any relevantly similar action to be right, "An action is said to be relevantly similar if, roughly, it shares with the first all the properties which were reasons why the first action was right. This will leave the priority point as the main point of contention between generalism and particularism. In arguing against locating ethical priority in the particular, I shall show, by using the example of Kant's ethics, that ethical priority should be located not in generalism per se, but in the ethical theory in which such generalism is grounded.
I will begin by outlining the two types of generalism -subsumptive and judgemental -to show the senses in which the latter requires judgement of the particular case. Imperative: "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." xvii Whilst this might be used as a test of specific maxims, there are certain general principles or maxims that Kant suggests pass this test. In the infamous four illustrations of this test in practice we have generated the following general principles: "One ought not to commit suicide", "One ought to keep promises", "One ought to utilise one's talents" and "One ought to help others" xviii The first two principles are examples of perfect duties, recognized by the fact that there is a contradiction in the universal form of their denial. The infringement of perfect duties would seem then to be something that is never allowable and, therefore, might seem to allow no room for judgement. The latter two examples express imperfect duties recognized by the fact that the contradiction in their denial is not a contradiction in the universal form of the maxim, but a contradiction in willing it in the universal form.
Subsumptive Generalism

xix
The first role for judgement in this example of judgemental generalism is a role that is common to all principles, whether they express perfect or imperfect duties. Kant explicitly recognises that the application of principles requires judgement and that this cannot be explained in terms of the application of a further general rule or principle. He writes:
So judgement itself must provide a concept, a concept through which we do not actually cognize anything but which only serves as a rule for the power of judgement itself -but not as an objective rule, to which it could adapt its judgement, since then we would need another power of judgement in order to decide whether or not the judgement is a case of that rule.
xx
Principles cannot be applied without a judgement to determine their applicability to a particular case and this cannot be formulated in general terms but is determinable by the particular case. Kant makes this completely explicit when he says:
It is obvious that between theory and practice there is required, besides, a middle term connecting them and providing a transition from one to the other, no matter how complete a theory may be; for, to a concept of the understanding, which contains a rule, must be added an act of judgment by which a practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is a case of the rule; and since judgment cannot always be given yet another rule by which to direct its subsumption (for this would go on to infinity).
xxi If we take the perfect duty not to commit suicide or, put positively, to preserve our life, then this does not imply that in a particular case someone should never take their life. Judgement is required to determine whether or not the particular case is an example of suicide. Kant makes this clear in his discussion of the casuistical questions that follow his discussion of killing oneself in The Doctrine of Virtue. He says: "Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in order to save one's country? -or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing oneself for the good of all humanity, also to be considered an act or heroism?" xxii Judgement of the particular case, which is a difficult matter as Kant makes clear from these examples, is necessary to know whether the general principle applies in this case. It is clearly not the case that all acts of killing oneself are deemed to be wrong, but only those that are judged to be cases of suicide rather than cases of heroism, martyrdom or some other case. The duty encapsulated in the prohibition on committing suicide is absolute but we need judgement to determine when we have a case of suicide. A similar point can be made with the perfect duty to tell the truth where we can see that this does not imply that one should never tell an untruth. We need to exercise judgement to determine whether the particular case is a genuine case of a lie. As Kant writes, "Can an untruth from mere politeness (e.g., the 'your obedient servant' at the end of a letter) be considered a lie? No one is deceived by it." xxiii In the case of the imperfect duties, the necessity for judgement in particular cases is built into them at the general level in Kant's account of what it is to be an imperfect duty. The necessity for judgement arises from two features of the general account given of imperfect duties. The duty to develop our talents and help others that were isolated in the Groundwork are further specified in the Metaphysics of Morals and labelled the two duties of virtue. The duty we owe to our own perfection is specified as not just developing our talents but also as morally perfecting ourselves.
The duty of virtue that we owe to others is the duty to seek their happiness. xxiv However, there is no ranking given to these two within the general theory and so judgement would be needed in the particular case if we had to choose between imperfect duties generated by these two duties of virtue.
The second feature of the general account of imperfect duties that implies the necessity for judgement in the particular case arises from the nature of an imperfect duty. to claim that particularism is incompatible with universalizability; then, if I can defend universalizability against attack, this will provide indirect support for generalism.
Universalizability and Billy Budd
Dancy considers that generalism in the theory of reasons embodies a commitment to universalizability. This is because the thesis of universalizability incorporates the claim that if we judge one action to be right then we must judge any relevantly similar action to be right. He says, "An action is said to be relevantly similar if, roughly, it shares with the first all the properties which were reasons why the first action was right." xxviii Given Dancy's thesis about the holism of reasons whereby what is a reason in a particular case might change its polarity or be no reason at all in another case, we can see why the rejection of universalizability might lead to particularism. The difference between Moore and Dancy, as well as the difference which concerns us, is that they provide different explanations for this phenomenon. Moore holds that these separate components always retain the same value although the value of the whole may be greater than the value of these parts. Dancy, on the other hand, is arguing that the value of these parts cannot be viewed atomistically. Moore's view assumes a particular doctrine of supervenience whereby the value of each of the parts remains the same. These values are dependent on the separate parts of the whole but when these qualities are combined in a complex whole, the value of the whole is not necessarily the same as the sum of the value of the parts.
Whilst still supporting a doctrine of supervenience, whereby value supervenes on other qualities X, This explanation is damaging to Dancy's account since it would appear to involve a denial of the second point of his characterisation of holism in the theory of value. The value of the complex whole will be identical with the value of the parts because the value of the parts will be determined in part by the context of this particular whole of which they form a part. Consequently, we do not have a case where the value of the whole is not identical with the value of the sum of its parts. This is essentially because the values of the parts have changed because of the particular whole in which they are located, and therefore this allegedly second feature of the holism of value or reasons seems to have collapsed into the first point. It just seems to be an explanation of the claim that the polarity of reasons or value might vary from occasion to occasion. Presumably, this variation is explicable in terms of Dancy's "global supervenience" and, if this is the case, the second point in the characterisation of holism of reasons is not a distinct point from the first, against which I have already argued.
It might be considered that Dancy could reply to this argument in terms of a refinement that he makes to his position in a recent article. xli Here instead of asserting without qualification that "The value of a complex or whole is not necessarily identical with the sum of the values of its elements or parts" (henceforward to be referred to as N.I, the Non-Identity Claim), he claims, But it is also true that some features that have value in that context do not contribute that value to the value of the whole. Their value cannot be put toward the value of the whole. In that sense, the value of the whole is not identical to the sum of the value of all the parts. But the value of the whole is identical to the sum of the values of the contributing parts, as we might put it. Any part, then, that contributes value must have that value to contribute, but some valuable parts do not contribute their value to the whole, even though their presence is necessary for the whole to have the value it does.
xlii The essence of this later position is the distinction that is now being drawn explicitly between:
(i) A part of a whole that does not contribute value to the whole but its presence is necessary for the whole to have the value that it does.
(ii) A part of a whole that does contribute value to the whole.
In terms of this then, N.I will remain true if by parts we intend either (i) or both (i) and ( Presumably, the idea is that the value of the friendship in this particular context or whole can change from its normal value without there being any change in the grounds or features of the relationship that make it a friendship but on the basis of something else about this context, namely that it is a pretence or a sham. The thought would be that Moore could not accept this since in holding "local supervenience" he could not allow for a change in the value of friendship without positing a change in the features that grounded that value. However, Dancy's doctrine of "global supervenience" allows a change in the value of friendship if there are other changes in the context but these need not be changes in the features that grounded the value but in other features such as these enabling conditions instead. In this case then, as we can see in the quotation above, "that it is not a sham" is not part of the ground for friendship.
If we interpret parts in the sense of (ii) when N.I. becomes false then, as I mentioned in discussing Dancy's position in Moral Reasons, the second part of his characterization of particularism will no longer be correct. It would only be correct if by parts we mean either (i) or both (i) and (ii).
However, to distinguish between (i) and (ii) seems itself to be atomistic. Why should these parts be separated? A judgemental generalist approaching this situation would not have to take it as a case of friendship and then point out that in fact the friendship is a pretence as though this is some separate component that counts against the positive value that friendship might be thought to contribute otherwise. The generalist, as I mentioned earlier, would exercise judgement and come to the global judgement that Truman's relationships are not genuine friendships where there is no reason to divide this into two components. Friendship has not changed its polarity here because this is not a case of genuine friendship just as in the borrowing book cases this was not a genuine case of borrowing.
In fact, Dancy's atomistic analysis of the parts of the whole is a feature of his view that appears to be more generalist than the one that I am advocating. This becomes apparent when he makes it clear that he is advocating a moderate form of holism where certain features can possess what he calls "default value". Thus, for example, friendship could be supposed to possess a positive default value, "causing needless pain", a negative default value and "the train is about to leave" which does not have a default value. xliv The context might change the values of those features that have a default value or result in the acquisition of value by those features that do not have a default value.
This seems remarkably like the form of generalism that I have called subsumptive generalism where we have certain general principles such as "friendship is a virtue" and "causing needless pain is wrong" and these are uncritically assumed to be applicable to the particular situation. After they have been entered in this form, Dancy's particularism kicks in with the claim that the overall context might lead them to have a different value to their normal one. The form of generalism that I was proposing was one where the judgement about what sort of case we have is made prior to the application of principles rather than applying these principles (or default values) and then claiming that if their value changes from their normal default value then this can be explained by other "parts" of the overall context that can be labelled "enabling conditions". Indeed, further remarks by Dancy reinforce this impression of generalism because a special explanation is required if a feature that has a default value does not have that value in a particular context. His analysis of particular situations involves an initial "looking away" from the particular situation and then evaluating the particular case in terms set up as a result of this initial "looking away."
A possible reply that Dancy might make to this point can be taken from his recent discussion of these issues in the area of reasons. xlv Here Dancy has presented an even more complicated picture than that which we have so far been considering in his discussion of the value of wholes and their parts. I shall take the following example of practical reasoning that he gives to illustrate some of these new complexities.
(1) I promised to do it.
(2) My promise was not given under duress.
(3) I am able to do it.
(4) There is no greater reason not to do it.
(5) So I do it.
xlvi Here (1) is described as a reason in favour or, as Dancy describes it, a "favourer" and is the only reason in this case. In the language of the value of wholes, this would presumably be equivalent to those parts that I labelled (ii), being those parts of the whole that do contribute value to the whole.
(2) and (3) are both enabling conditions and thus like the parts that I labelled (i). The distinction between (2) and (3) is between a specific enabler and a general enabler where the former is something specific to promising and the latter would apply to the larger class of all my actions.
Condition (4) earlier, the appeal to rational nature as the ultimate end supplies the "general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles." l Rational nature will be appealed to as both the ground for our general principles and for the judgement about the appropriate description to be given to the particular case so that the appropriate general principle is applied. As noted earlier, Kant writes, "an act of judgement by which a practitioner distinguishes whether or not something is a case of the rule."
The locus of ethical correctness lies in ethical theories
li So, if we take an example mentioned earlier of whether or not killing oneself after having been bitten by a rabid dog counts as a case of suicide or not harming others, then our guiding rationale will be to consider which of these would count as respecting rational nature in this particular case.
It is the ultimate standard of ethical correctness embodied in Kant's ethical theory that provides the rationale for the general principles that we are bring to the particular cases and for the judgement necessary to understand which principles are applicable in a particular case.
Why should we accept that this is where the locus of ethical correctness is to be located? It seems to be a natural extension of judgemental generalism in its explicit inclusion of the rationale for this form of generalism. I have also given reasons for rejecting the support that Dancy offers for particularism. However, there may be the lingering suspicion that somehow a direct confrontation with the particular case without any intervening ethical theory is where ethical correctness lies.
However, as Martha Nussbaum has convincingly pointed out, this direct confrontation, with what she calls concrete ethical practice, is itself based on theory. She says:
People who don't think about the Kantian/Rawlsian theory … do not therefore simply go out and relate to one another in accordance with refined particular perceptions. Their mutual interactions are governed by a variety of theories, some metaphysical and religious, some customary.
lii Some of these theories are, she claims bad theories. They are often neither explicitly formulated nor been subjected to critical reflection. Discovering the locus of ethical correctness in an explicitly articulated theory is clearly to be preferred to this. This will enable consistent judgements to be made based on explicitly articulated theory. Indeed, in order to distinguish the sort of ethical theory that I am advocating from the uncritical acceptance of theories built into concrete ethical practice, Williams' definition given earlier needs to be supplemented to make it clear that the ethical theory is one where we have a general account that is explicitly articulated.
Where I disagree with Nussbaum is in the contrast that she draws between this concrete ethical practice that is based on bad theories and "refined ethical practice", where she appears to suggest that we can dispense with theories altogether. Indeed, the implication is that the "sphere governed … by fine tuned Jamesian perceptions" liii is not influenced by any theories whatsoever. These fine tuned perceptions are appealed to as a necessary supplement to the Aristotelian theory since they "make out the force of such obscure claims as the claim that 'the discernment rests with perception'." liv However, no argument is advanced for why these should be distinguished from concrete ethical practice, some of which is based on bad theories or, at the very least, unexamined implicit theories. Why should the "finely tuned perception" in the novels of Henry James be uninfluenced by bad theories? Indeed, given some of the conclusions reached in his novels, he is advocating what might be viewed both critically and uncritically as immoral behaviour. lv There is no reason to take these as standards of ethical correctness.
Nussbaum points out that these novels give us both an horizontal and vertical extension of ordinary life and enable an appreciation of the emotions involved without the distraction of personal jealousies or biases. However, why should we suppose that reading these novels would give us the fine tuned perception necessary to get things right in ordinary life? Why should we assume that this sort of training in "right perception" has not incorporated bad theories? Are we to suppose that novelists such as James, Dickens or Proust are immune from the bad theories that characterise other areas of concrete ethical practice? There is no argument advanced why this finely tuned perception should be taken as the standard of ethical correctness any more than what Nussbaum calls ethical practice, which, by her own admission, is based on bad theories.
Conclusion
I have argued that the essence of the dispute between particularists and generalists lies in where ethical correctness is located. The arguments advanced have rejected locating this in the particular.
However, generalism alone is not enough. The guiding rationale of an explicitly articulated ethical theory in which these general principles are located is where we should look for our standard of ethical correctness.
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